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* The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 05-4075
___________
WU CHEN,
Petitioner,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
________________________
                                          
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A 78 232 766)
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 27, 2006
BEFORE: FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge.*
(Filed: April 3, 2007)
2___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of his application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
I.
Petitioner Wu Chen applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture in September 2000, seven months after entering the
United States without permission.  After a hearing on April 25, 2001, an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) sitting in New York, determined that petitioner was not credible and denied
him relief.  In July 2003, the BIA remanded the matter to the IJ based on recent Second
Circuit cases concerning testimony and credibility findings.  A motion for change of
venue was later granted, and an IJ sitting in Newark, New Jersey, then denied petitioner’s
application for relief in December 2003 after a hearing.
In his application and testimony, petitioner described the following events. 
Petitioner was born in 1967 and married his wife in 1989.  They have two children, a
daughter born in September 1990 and a son born in December 1997.  Three months after
his daughter was born, Chinese officials forced his wife to have a intrauterine device
(“IUD”) inserted into her body.   The IUD caused her uterus to bleed but officials did not
3permit her to remove it.  Late in 1991, petitioner and his wife hired a private doctor to
remove the IUD.
Soon thereafter, petitioner’s wife became pregnant.  In February 1992, family
planning officials, after discovering the pregnancy during an IUD checkup, forced her to
have an abortion and imposed a fine on the couple.  In May 1992, a second IUD was
inserted.  In 1994, petitioner’s request to have another child was denied.  In February
1997, the couple hired a private doctor to remove the IUD, and petitioner’s wife soon
became pregnant.  She hid at her uncle’s home in another village during the pregnancy,
and returned to give birth in December 1997 according to a local tradition that mandated
that she give birth in her home.  Someone reported the birth to the authorities and, in
February 1998, officials came to the house and took petitioner’s wife away for
sterilization.  When petitioner went to the family planning office to complain, officials
threatened him.  In February 2000, petitioner received a notice demanding that he pay a
fine.  Instead, he left the country later that month.
 The IJ determined that petitioner was not credible for a number of reasons.  First,
petitioner submitted a letter from his wife that the IJ found to be “strikingly similar” to an
addendum Wu Chen attached to his asylum application.  In addition, neither the
petitioner’s statement nor his wife’s letter described the abortion and sterilization
procedures with any detail.  Second, the IJ did not credit the abortion and sterilization
certificates that petitioner presented.  Third, the IJ determined that under Chinese policy,
the couple’s second child would have been permitted—subject to a fine for failing to
4space the birth of the children properly—because rural households are allowed a second
child if the first one is a girl.  Finally, the IJ found the forced abortion claim to be
“absurd” because it made no sense for the wife to report for an IUD checkup after having
her IUD removed.  The BIA affirmed after explaining that petitioner had done “very little
on appeal” to contest the IJ’s adverse credibility findings.
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
II.
On appeal, petitioner challenges the adverse credibility findings of the IJ, and the
BIA’s agreement with those findings.  “Adverse credibility determinations are reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard.”  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 636
(3d Cir. 2006).  We will uphold an adverse credibility determination unless “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B); Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  Petitioner provided a
letter written by his wife that the IJ noted was “strikingly similar” to a written statement
that petitioner signed and attached to his application.  Petitioner asserts that the IJ
improperly penalized him for “too much consistency” between the couple’s description of
events.  This argument, however, mischaracterizes the analysis of the IJ, who was not
concerned that the documents described the same events.  Instead, the IJ questioned the
documents’ use of similar paragraph structures and identical phrases and sentences. 
When the IJ provided petitioner an opportunity at the hearing to explain the similarities,
5he failed to do so: 
Q: Did you ask [your wife] to write you this letter? 
A: The attorney request[ed] that I ask my wife to write this about what happened
to her, for the Judge.
Q. Did he tell her what to say? 
A: No, he didn’t tell her, she wrote out whatever happened to her.
Q: Okay. Did she have a sample to go by?
A: She knew what happened to her . . . with the . . . IUD insertion and
sterilization.
Q: Okay, did you read this letter? 
A: Yes, after she [had] written it. 
Q: Do you think this is in your wife’s own words? 
A: Yes.
The government attorney also asked petitioner about his wife’s letter: 
Q: . . . Did you tell her what your statement said, so she could write her letter?
A: No, she wrote that herself.  Her story is similar, she talk[s] about her
experiences. 
AR 26-27.  The IJ, not surprisingly, did not find petitioner’s answers plausible.  The
similarities between the two documents suggested that petitioner’s wife did not
independently write her letter “in her own words.”  Yet, petitioner failed to acknowledge
any coordination or explain why the documents were similar.
Petitioner also challenges the IJ’s findings with regard to the IUD checkup and
6subsequent forced abortion, family planning polices in China, and supporting
documentation.  While there may be some plausible explanation for petitioner’s wife
attending an IUD checkup after removing the device, we do not believe it was
unreasonable for the IJ to question why she would do so.  Further, the IJ provided specific
reasons why she did not credit the supporting medical documentation, including
petitioner’s failure to explain why the documents were issued.  Finally, while the IJ could
have noted that the State Department report indicates that implementation of family
planning policies at the village level is inconsistent, this does not render her credibility
findings erroneous.  We conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was reasonable
and that, as a result, the denial of petitioner’s claim for asylum is supported by substantial
evidence.  
III. 
For the same reasons that petitioner’s asylum claim fails, we conclude that he is
not entitled to withholding of removal, which requires the applicant to demonstrate a
“clear probability” of persecution if removed.  See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413
(1984).  Petitioner has also failed to present evidence entitling him to protection under the
Convention Against Torture; i.e., he has not shown that it is more likely than not that he
will be tortured if removed.  See Obale v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 453 F.3d
151, 161 (3d Cir. 2006). 
IV.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the BIA or IJ erred in rejecting his
7application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture.  For the reasons discussed above, we will deny the petition.  
